Very first Impressions
I am not residence of the two day meeting of the Mountain-Pacific Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers hosted by the College of Southern Nevada in Las Vegas. The five hour drive every way was not also negative. This was my very first time participating with the SCP. The lineup of speakers was impressive and the subject, Thoughts and Persons, was excellent for my personal PhD study, but I was nonetheless not confident what to anticipate. Any issues I had going in have been immediately allayed. The whole occasion was effectively organized and I discovered each and every sessions to offer you some inspiring suggestions.
The principal speaker was Dr. Angus Menuge who is Professor of Philosophy at Concordia University. Professor Menuge served as a co- editor of, and contributor to, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (Wiley- Blackwell, 2018) which I relied on heavily for my paper presented at this occasion. It was excellent to hear straight from somebody who has a far deeper understanding of substance dualism and test my personal suggestions against his presentation.
There is a excellent list of participants from across the United States, but 1 issue I noticed is that I was the only representative of a Seminary. I want there was additional seminaries represented.
- Steven Duncan—no present affiliation (retired)
- Robert Haworth—University of Wisconsin
- Joseph Schmid—St. Theodore Guerin Catholic Higher College, Noblesville, IN
- Nolan Whitaker—Biola University
- Lex Newman—University of Utah
- Jon Kelly—Biola University
- Steve Nemes—unattached
- Julia Stubbs—Biola University
- J. R. Miller—Southern California Seminary
- Sharon Yan—Indiana University-Purdue University Columbus
- Alexandra Romanyshyn—SLU
- Jacob Huls—Indiana University—Purdue University Indianapolis
- Julie Miller—Faulkner University
- James Kintz—St. Joseph’s College of Maine
- Harriet Baber—University of San Diego
- Janai Shields—Western Kentucky University
- Beth Seacord—College of Southern Nevada
- Keith Hess—Ken Hochstetter College of Southern Nevada
- Christopher Tomaszewski—Baylor University
- Hayden Stephan—SLU
- Kenneth Boyce—University of Missouri
- Brandon Rickabaugh—Baylor University
- Stephen Evensen—Biola University
- Alex Cavender—St. Olaf College
- Jason McMartin—Biola University
- JT Turner—Anderson University
- Joshua Farris—Houston Baptist University
Takeaways & Inquiries
I spoke on day two of the conference. My session was chaired by Jannai Shields of Western Kentucky University who presented a paper “Avoiding the Collapse of Substance Emergentism.” Surprisingly, Jannai was the only emergentist I met there and most everybody else was arguing for some type of substance dualism. I heard a couple guys comment that this was rather uncommon as they have been applied to becoming the minority view at most gatherings of philosophers.
I presented my paper titled: “Theistic Evolution and Emergent Personhood: Challenges from Moreland’s Thomistic-Like Dualism.” I had some excellent interaction through the Q&A and got some suggestions that may well refine my paper.
1 query I have but to answer is this, what is the connection (if any) amongst nominalism and theistic evolution? Far more especially, is nominalism (the denial of universals such that all human qualities are situated in space and time) entailed by philosophers, such as William Hasker (who is not a physicalist) and Nancy Murphy (who is a physicalist), who each accept emergentism as an explanation of personhood? In other words, must all theistic evolutionists accept nominalism? Or is the only escape route a God of the gaps argument? The argument would be phrased a thing like this: If the physical physique is the total trigger of personhood (no Divine pleading) then all emergentists have to be nominalists.
The closest I can get is that Hasker argues the soul is mereologically very simple with no separable components and nomologically dependent upon the brain and brain stem for existence and improvement. Interestingly, he argues that the God does develop the soul via some sort of psycho-physical laws. This lends toward some sort of pansychism which holds that basic physical entities have conscious experiences which bind with each other to type conscious persons. Hasker does say that even although particular person is an emergent house of the physical, the soul can be maintained just after death by God outdoors the physique and eventually merged with a resurrection physique (viz. Descartes). Does this imply that personhood in this globe is a nominalist, but in the subsequent life is a universal?
Taking the query back 1 step, Emergentism argues that non-physical potentiality is grounded in physicality which, to me, is not logically achievable (p can’t create non-p). it was valuable to hear Jannai Shields speak as his paper attempted to make an argument that would prove this is achievable. Nevertheless, even if it could be shown that personhood is a item of the purely physical stuff of the human physique, this does not answer the query of nominalism.
But appropriate now these are all concerns without the need of clear answers. I had a couple of conversations with unique people today about this such as Brandon Rickabaugh who has written a bit about Hasker, but no 1 could supply any actual clarity.
I admit, the above is a bit of a jumbled mass of thoughts that have to have to be worked out, but I will have to retain searching into this for an answer.
Dr. J.R. Miller is a Professor of Applied Theology and Leadership & Dean of On the net Understanding at Southern California Seminary. Dr. Miller has 20+ years of pastoral ministry practical experience and a diverse educational background in science, theology, philosophy, and ethics. He has authored several books on church history, biblical theology, and Leadership. Joe and his wife Suzanne love the sun and surf with their three sons in San Diego, CA.